The use of explosive weapons in populated areas has been widespread in Myanmar, killing and injuring civilians, damaging and destroying civilian infrastructure, and impacting the provision of healthcare and access to education. Though explosive weapons use in Myanmar has been pervasive, civilian harm has been underreported and the conflict overlooked. This article outlines some of the direct and reverberating effects of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas in this context, as reported in the few sources collecting and sharing data on the subsequent civilian harm.
Introduction
In February 2021, the Myanmar military ousted the newly re-elected government in a military coup that ended more than ten years of civilian rule. This instigated country-wide, peaceful protests against the coup. Widespread military violence against these civilian protests led to the formation of local defence forces, many operating with ties to the ousted government. The coup simultaneously intensified long-lasting conflicts between ethnic armed organisations in the country's border regions and with the military.1
The use of explosive weapons in populated areas by the military and non-state armed groups, has been widespread in Myanmar, killing and injuring civilians, damaging and destroying civilian infrastructure, and impacting the provision of healthcare and access to education. While explosive weapons use has been less frequent in Myanmar’s ‘heartland’ regions of Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay, which remain under military control, explosive weapons have been frequently deployed in regions under contention or controlled by ethnic armed organisations.
The use of explosive weapons in Myanmar has increased every year since 2021. This is indicated by the increase in incidents of explosive weapons use recorded by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). ACLED data suggests that as incidents of explosive weapons use increased, incidents of other types of violence perpetrated by state and non-state actors in Myanmar decreased. This includes the use of firearms, arrests, threats, oppression and roadblocks, seen more frequently earlier in the conflict.
Nonetheless, the pervasive use of explosive weapons in Myanmar has received little attention. The available data on the use and harm from explosive weapons is largely on direct impacts, often reported by conflict monitoring organisations that track incidents in which explosive weapons have caused direct harm to civilians. Though organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have conducted interviews and documented some indirect effects of the use of explosive weapons on civilians in Myanmar, the reverberating effects are still poorly understood and underreported.2
This article adds analysis and context to the existing picture of civilian harm in Myanmar. By examining data on explosive weapons use and impact recorded by ACLED and Insecurity Insight, it highlights patterns of harm stemming from the use of these weapons, namely increased civilian fatalities, and disruptions to the provision of education and healthcare. This analysis primarily draws on ACLED data and Insecurity Insight’s dataset on explosive weapons incidents. In text references to ACLED and Insecurity Insight draw on these unless otherwise stated. Importantly, the data analysed does not include many reverberating or indirect harms caused by explosive weapons, where much further work is necessary. As such, the impact highlighted herein provides only a partial picture of the harm from explosive weapons use in Myanmar. Given the high numbers of civilians harmed, greater attention from the international community is warranted.
Rising numbers of incidents of explosive weapons use recorded by ACLED
Following the February 2021 military coup, ACLED recorded a sharp increase in incidents of violence perpetrated by state and non-state armed groups in Myanmar, including those which resulted in harm to civilians.3 The Myanmar military has been responsible for some 65 percent of reported violence against civilians from the time of the coup until August 2024, according to data from ACLED.
From 2020 to 2021, there was a fivefold rise in the total number of incidents which resulted in harm to civilians recorded by ACLED. This can largely be explained by the military’s violent crackdown on country-wide peaceful protests, but also by fighting between the military and newly formed armed local defence groups, and renewed fighting between the military and armed ethnic organisations.4 At the beginning of the conflict, civilians were frequently shot at checkpoints or tortured in prisons, for example, according to data from ACLED. Over time, and in areas further away from the capital, the military more frequently used explosive weapons, such as air and drone strikes, shelling, artillery and missile attacks. Shelling, artillery and missile attacks were also increasingly used by non-state armed groups from 2022 and onwards, as was the use of air and drone strikes starting in 2023.
The rate of violent incidents in which civilians were harmed increased slightly in 2022. ACLED reported that attacks on and targeting of civilian populations by the military continued across the country, with the majority of this violence “involving direct attacks with small weapons on individuals who are unarmed and not participating in demonstrations.”5 In 2022, Myanmar had the highest number of events of violence targeting civilians by state forces operating domestically in the world, according to ACLED.6
The rate of incidents in which civilians were harmed remained largely unchanged in 2023 despite an intensification in fighting and increase in airstrikes by the military following Operation 1027, a coordinated attack against the military by ethnic armed organisations in the north and subsequent anti-military offenses elsewhere inspired by the operation.7 The incident rate for the first eight months of 2024 indicates that a slight increase from 2023 levels can be expected, as fighting continues in many areas across the country.
Since the military coup in 2021, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has made up a meaningful and growing part of the overall violence causing harm to civilians in Myanmar. Between February 2021 and August 2024, explosive weapons were used in more than a third of incidents in which civilians were harmed. Every year since 2021, the use of explosive weapons has made up a growing portion of the total number of violent incidents causing harm to civilians, according to ACLED data.
In 2021, incidents in which ACLED recorded civilian harm caused by the use of explosive weapons more than doubled compared to 2020. The number of incidents almost doubled again in 2022 and rose by another 60 percent year-on-year in 2023. In August 2024, the number of incidents had already surpassed those of 2023. This points to a concerning trend in which the use of explosive weapons causing harm to the civilian population has been growing throughout the conflict.
The Myanmar military has been responsible for the majority (70 percent) of incidents in which explosive weapons caused harm to civilians between February 2021 and August 2024. From 2022 and onwards, ACLED data also shows an increase in shelling, artillery and missile strikes that harmed civilians by non-state armed groups and, from 2023, the use of air and drone strikes.
Direct effects of explosive weapons in Myanmar
Civilian deaths from explosive weapons in 2021-2024
The number of civilians killed by explosive weapons in Myanmar has grown every year since the military took power in February 2021. ACLED recorded 199 civilian fatalities in 2021. This number increased to 564 in 2022, and 1,135 in 2023. As of 31 August 2024, 1,638 civilians had been killed by explosive weapons in 2024, surpassing the number of fatalities in 2023.
The number of civilian deaths from explosive weapons has steadily increased over time as a proportion of total civilian deaths recorded by ACLED, which includes deaths caused by other types of violence, as shown in Figure 1. From January to August 2024, explosive weapons caused 62 percent of all civilian fatalities in Myanmar. This follows a pattern of incremental growth since 2021, when explosive weapons caused 11 percent of total civilian deaths, followed by a rise to 20 percent in 2022 and 39 percent in 2023, as shown in Figure 1.
ACLED data suggests that the rise in civilian deaths from air and drone strikes has contributed to the proportional increase in civilian fatalities caused by explosive weapons. Since the coup, the increase in civilian deaths from air and drone strikes has grown exponentially, as shown in Figure 2. Most significantly, the number of civilian fatalities rose from 14 in 2021 to 113 in 2022, amounting to a sevenfold increase. In 2023, this number grew by another 300 percent to 496 fatalities.8 The number of civilian deaths from air and drone strikes between January and August 2024 increased 92 percent from last year to 951 civilian fatalities. This year-on-year increase in civilian deaths, as shown in Figure 2, is a concerning trend and firmly underscores the danger of deploying explosive weapons in populated areas.
The impact of explosive weapons on healthcare facilities from 2021 to 2023
The number of incidents of explosive weapons affecting healthcare increased significantly in Myanmar following the February 2021 coup, according to data from Insecurity Insight. Since the coup, the number of incidents have increased year-on-year, as shown in Figure 3, with explosive weapons use impacting healthcare almost every month.
The proportion of air-launched explosive weapons affecting healthcare is particularly noteworthy. According to data from Insecurity Insight, the use of air-launched explosive weapons, such as air and drone strikes, has increased as a proportion of explosive weapons incidents affecting healthcare year-on-year. From January to July 2024, air-launched explosive weapons amounted to 73 percent of all explosive weapons incidents impacting healthcare, up from 55 percent in 2023, 37 percent in 2022 and 12 percent in 2021.
A report by Insecurity Insight into the impact of air-launched explosive weapons on healthcare in 2023 found that such use by the Myanmar caused a significant increase in the damage or destruction of health facilities, amounting to more than a 300 percent increase from 2022. Sagaing Region, Kayah and Shan States were particularly affected. In 2023, Insecurity Insight reported that “Myanmar military aircraft dropped explosive weapons that damaged or destroyed clinics, hospitals, pharmacies and rural health centres.”9 These were not isolated incidents, but part of wider attacks by the military. Frequently, other civilian infrastructure was damaged, such as homes, monasteries and schools.10
From 2023 onwards, a smaller number of incidents of air-launched explosive weapons deployed by non-state armed groups impacting healthcare have also been reported. For example, Insecurity Insight recorded at least 25 incidents where units of the local resistance forces used drones armed with explosive weapons to attack hospitals and health centres that were occupied by the Myanmar military in 2023.11
The impact of explosive weapons on education
In recent years, Myanmar has been one of the countries in the world most heavily affected by attacks on education, according to the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) and Insecurity Insight.12 The majority of incidents affecting education have involved the use of explosive weapons.
Insecurity Insight identified more than 250 incidents of explosive weapons affecting education between February 2021 and July 2024. The number of incidents peaked in May and June of 2021, exceeding 40 and 30, respectively. The following eighteen months saw a drop in incidents of explosive weapons use affecting education.
From December 2022, the frequency and quantity of explosive weapons incidents affecting Myanmar’s education sector increased, according to data from Insecurity Insight. Between December 2022 and July 2024, at least one incident in which explosive weapons use affected access to education occurred every month, though often more occurred. Data from Insecurity Insight shows that almost 40 percent of incidents of explosive weapons affecting education in post-coup Myanmar occurred after October 2023. This corresponds with an intensification in fighting across the country following the launch of Operation 1027 in Shan state, and the anti-military offensives it inspired elsewhere in Myanmar.13 Between 27 October 2023 and 31 July 2024, Shan State, Rakhine State and Sagaing Region all experienced high numbers of incidents where explosive weapons impacted education. More than two thirds of these were attributed to the Myanmar military, whilst non-state armed groups were responsible for a small number of incidents, according to data from Insecurity Insight.
The Myanmar military was recorded as a perpetrator by Insecurity Insight in 129 of the 250 incidents affecting education between February 2021 and July 2024. In the overwhelming majority of these, it was the only recorded perpetrator. Thirty-eight incidents were attributed to one or more of Myanmar’s many ethnic armed organisations or anti-military non-state armed groups, and in 93 incidents it was not possible to identify the perpetrator. This data indicates that the military is the armed actor most frequently responsible for the use of explosive weapons that affects education in Myanmar. It also highlights challenges when it comes to attribution, as shown by the number of unattributed incidents.
Understanding the reverberating effects of explosive weapons on education in Myanmar The majority of data collected on the impact of explosive weapons on education across the globe includes direct effects, such as the damage or destruction of facilities, or death or injury of students, teachers or other educational staff. The indirect or reverberating effects of explosive weapons are many and underreported. GCPEA has reported that the “widespread targeted attacks on, and military use of, schools, universities and education infrastructure in Myanmar has created a hostile educational context for students, parents and educators, who have found it increasingly challenging to make safe choices with regards to their learning, their children and their jobs.”14 This has caused learning interruption from pre-primary to higher education, and will have immediate long-term impacts not only on civilians access to education, but on job prospects, livelihoods, mental health and beyond.15 |
The need for international response
Explosive weapons have played a marked role in the conflict in Myanmar. As the conflict has evolved, explosive weapons use has risen, with the number of civilian fatalities reported by ACLED increasing significantly as an absolute number and as a proportion of total civilian deaths recorded in the country. This rise in civilian fatalities can in part be explained by an escalation in the number of air and drone strikes, primarily by the Myanmar military.
Explosive weapons use has disrupted primary through university education and hindered the provision of and access to healthcare. Although the quantitative data on explosive weapons use in Myanmar provides some insight into its impact on civilians, more analysis on the indirect effects are needed to understand the full extent of harm and inform responses to this.
Analysis on the future of conflict in Myanmar are few and far between. A handful published in the first quarter of 2024, asserted that fighting would continue. One of the most recent, from April, suggested that villages, towns and other populated areas may increasingly become the subject of fights between resistance groups and the Myanmar military.16 Ye Myo Hein, a Visiting Senior Expert at the US Institute of Peace, argued that resistance groups - viewing the current conflict landscape as a “historic opportunity to remove the military” - are unlikely to stop fighting until the military is ousted from power.17 Analysts at the International Crisis Group and Brookings Institute argue that the military’s position will continue to weaken and that it will suffer further territorial losses.18 This, however, is not likely to stop it from fighting. In response, it will continue to launch airstrikes against territories it has lost.19 This indicates a continuation of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as shown in ACLED data from January to July 2024.
The widespread civilian harm from explosive weapons set out in this article, and the likelihood of continued use as the conflict persists, underscores the need to dedicate more resources to understanding and addressing the direct and indirect impact of explosive weapons on civilian life in Myanmar.